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Abstract 
Government policies and behavior exert a strong influence on the investment climate through their 
impact on costs, risks and barriers to competition. Key factors affecting the investment climate through their 
impact on costs are: corruption, taxes, the regulatory burden and extent of red tape in general, factor markets 
(labor, intermediate materials and capital), the quality of infrastructure, technological and innovation 
support, and the availability and cost of finance. While the investment climate surveys are quite useful in 
identifying major issues and bottlenecks as perceived by firms, the data collected is also meant to provide 
the basic information for an econometric assessment of the impact or contribution of the investment climate 
(IC) variables on productivity. We believe that improving the investment climate (IC) is a key policy 
instrument to promote economic growth and to mitigate the institutional, legal, economic and social factors 
that are constraining the convergence of per capita income and labor productivity of Turkey relative to more 
developed countries. For that, we need to identify the main investment climate variables that affect 
economic performance measures like total factor productivity, employment, wages, exports and foreign 
direct investment and this is the main goal of this paper. In turn, that quantified impact is used in the 
advocacy for, and design of, investment-climate reforms. 
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As developing countries face the pressures and impacts of globalization, they are seeking 
ways to stimulate growth and employment within this context of increased openness. With 
most of these countries having secured a reasonable level of macroeconomic stability, they are 
now focusing on issues of competitiveness and productivity through microeconomic reform 
programs. Governments are reformulating their strategies and making increased 
competitiveness a key priority of government programs. 
 
A significant component of country competitiveness is having a good investment climate or 
business environment. The investment climate, as defined in the WDR (2005), is “the set of 
location-specific factors shaping the opportunities and incentives for firms to invest 
productively, create jobs and expand.” It is now well accepted and documented, conceptually 
and empirically, that the scope and nature of regulations on economic activity and factor 
markets - the so-called investment climate and business environment - can significantly and 
adversely impact productivity, growth and economic activity (see Bosworth and Collins, 2003;  
Rodrik and Subramanian, 2004; Loayza, Oviedo and Serven, 2004; McMillan, 1998 and 2004; 
OECD, 2001; Wilkinson, 2001; Alexander et al., 2004; Djankov et al., 2002; Haltiwanger, 
2002; He et al., 2003; World Bank, 2003; and World Bank, 2004 a,b). Prescott (1998) argues 
that to understand large international income differences, it is necessary to explain differences 
in productivity (TFP).  His main candidate to explain those gaps is the resistance to the 
adoption of new technologies and to the efficient use of current operating technologies, which 
in turn are conditioned by the institutional and policy arrangements a society employs 
(investment climate variables). Recently, Cole et al. (2004) also have argued that Latin 
America has not replicated Western economic success due to the productivity (TFP) gap. They 
point to competitive barriers (investment climate constraints) as the promising channels for 
understanding the low productivity observed in Latin American countries.  
 
Government policies and behavior exert a strong influence on the investment climate 
through their impact on costs, risks and barriers to competition. Key factors affecting the 
investment climate through their impact on costs are: corruption, taxes, the regulatory burden 
and extent of red tape in general, factor markets (labor, intermediate materials and capital), the 
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quality of infrastructure, technological and innovation support, and the availability and cost of 
finance. 
 
For example, Kasper (2002) shows that poorly understood “state paternalism” has usually 
created unjustified barriers to entrepreneurial activity, resulting in poor growth and a stifling 
environment. Kerr (2002) shows that a quagmire of regulation, which is all too common, is a 
massive deterrent to investment and economic growth. As a case in point, McMillan (1988) 
argues that obtrusive government regulation before 1984 was the key issue in New Zealand’s 
slide in the world per-capita income rankings. Hernando de Soto (2002) describes one key 
adverse effect of significant business regulation and weak property rights: with costly firm 
regulations, fewer firms choose to register and more become informal. Also, if there are high 
transaction costs involved in registering property, assets are less likely to be officially 
recorded, and therefore cannot be used as collateral to obtain loans, thereby becoming “dead” 
capital. 
 
Likewise, poor infrastructure and limited transport and trade services increase logistics 
costs, rendering otherwise competitive products uncompetitive, as well as limiting rural 
production and people’s access to markets, which adversely affects poverty and economic 
activity (Guasch 2004).  
 
The pursuit of greater competitiveness and a better investment climate is leading countries -
often assisted by multilaterals such as the World Bank - to undertake their own studies to 
identify the principal bottlenecks in terms of competitiveness and the investment climate, and 
evaluate the impact these have, to set priorities for intervention and reform. The most common 
instrument used has been firm-level surveys, known as Investment Climate Assessments 
(ICAs), from which both subjective evaluations of obstacles and objective hard-data numbers 
with direct links to costs and productivity are elicited and imputed. Such surveys collect data at 
firm level on the following themes:  a) infrastructure, b) red tape, corruption and crime, c) 
finance and corporate governance, d) quality, innovation and labor skills and d) other control 
variables like capacity utilization, age and size of the firm, etc. 
 
While the Investment Climate Assessments are quite useful in identifying major issues and 
bottlenecks as perceived by firms, the data collected is also meant to provide the basic 
information for an econometric assessment of the impact or contribution of the investment 
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climate (IC) variables on productivity. In turn, that quantified impact is used in the advocacy 
for, and design of, investment-climate reform. Yet providing reliable and robust estimates of 
productivity estimates of the IC variables from the surveys is not a straightforward task since; 
first, the surveys do not provide panel-type data on IC variables; second, neither the production 
function parameters nor the functional form are observed; and third, there is an identification 
issue separating total factor productivity (TFP) component from the inputs of the production 
function. 
 
When any of the production function inputs is influenced by common causes affecting 
productivity, like IC variables or other plant characteristics, there is a simultaneous equation 
problem. In general, one should expect the productivity to be correlated with the production 
function inputs (technological progress is not Hicks neutral) and, therefore, inputs should be 
treated as endogenous regressors when estimating production functions. This property has 
demanded special care with the econometric specification when estimating those productivity 
effects and in the choice of the most appropriate way of measuring productivity.  
 
There is an extensive literature discussing the advantages and disadvantages of using 
different statistical estimation techniques and/or growth accounting (index number) techniques 
to estimate productivity or Total Factor Productivity (TFP). For overviews of different 
productivity concepts and aggregation alternatives see, for example, Solow (1957), Hall 
(1990), Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998),  Batelsman and Doms (2000), Hulten (2001), 
Diewert and Nakamura (2002), Jorgenson (2003), Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987), 
Olley and Pakes (1996) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). 
 
We believe that improving the investment climate (IC) is a key policy instrument to 
promote economic growth and to mitigate the institutional, legal, economic and social factors 
that are constraining the convergence of per capita income and labor productivity of Turkey 
relative to more developed countries. For that, we need to identify the main investment climate 
variables that affect economic performance measures like total factor productivity, 
employment, wages, exports and foreign direct investment and this is the main goal of this 
paper. 
 
The recent trade literature has emphasized the importance of firm heterogeneity in 
understanding export behaviour. Traditional trade theory either has all firms or none of the 
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firms in a given sector export. However, micro-level evidence shows this picture to be 
seriously flawed. Even within so-called export sectors, a substantial fraction of firms 
exclusively sell in the domestic market. Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999), Clerides, Lach and 
Tybout (1998), and Aw, Chung and Roberts (2000) all find that larger and more productive 
firms are more likely to export. This heterogeneity shows up both across and within sectors. 
Moreover, these stylized facts seem to be common to both developed and developing countries. 
The work of Bernard and Jensen (1995, 1999), for instance, focuses on the U.S., whereas 
Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) analyze Colombia, Mexico and Morocco. The results 
presented in this paper on Turkey confirm many of these stylized facts. In particular, 
productivity is shown to have an important impact on a firm's probability to export and larger 
firms are more productive. This result holds up even after controlling for a large variety of 
investment climate variables.  
 
These stylized facts have given rise to a number of important theoretical contributions. 
Melitz (2003) proposes a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous firms. Each firm 
draws its productivity from a distribution. To enter the export market, firms need to pay a fixed 
cost. As a result, only the larger or more productive firms will choose to export, while the 
smaller or less productive firms will decide to only serve the domestic market. Yeaple (2005) 
is able to obtain the same qualitative results, without assuming that firms are randomly 
assigned their productivity levels. Instead, ex ante homogeneous firms get to choose between 
competing technologies, and can hire workers of heterogeneous skill. Different workers have 
comparative advantage in different technologies. As in Melitz (2003), there is a fixed cost in 
accessing export markets. The model generates ex post heterogeneous firms, with the low 
productivity firms serving the domestic markets, and the high productivity firms exporting. 
 
What keeps low productivity firms from exporting in both Melitz (2003) and Yeaple (2005) 
is the existence of a fixed cost to enter export markets. There is empirical evidence supporting 
this view. Das, Roberts and Tybout (2006), for instance, estimate that Colombian chemical 
plants need to pay a fixed cost of around $1 million to enter export markets. Other papers, such 
as Bernard and Jensen (2004) for the U.S. and Bernard and Wagner (2001) for Germany 
further substantiate the existence of fixed costs involved with exporting. 
 
In our study on Turkey we find, for instance, that having fixed costs like web page, R&D 
activities, security costs etc., increase the probability to export. In contrast to Melitz (2003), the 
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theoretical work by Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003) suggests that fixed export costs 
are not needed to match the heterogeneity in export performance. They propose a model with 
Bertrand competition, where the price a firm can charge is bound by potential rivals. In this 
setup it is easier for a firm to sell at home than abroad. To export, a firm needs to overcome the 
hurdle of transportation costs, whereas to sell in the domestic market, transportation costs 
reduce the threat of foreign rivals. Therefore, firms that export will be more productive. 
 
Although much of the empirical evidence points to more productive firms becoming 
exporters and not the other way around (see, e.g., by Bernard and Jensen, 1999, and Clerides et 
al., 1998), the theory on the relation between productivity and exports is not exempt from 
reverse causality or the simultaneity found in Turkey. Whereas Melitz (2003) and Bernard et 
al. (2003) argue that high productivity firms self select to become exporters, it is also true that 
access to export markets may make firms more productive. In the work by Grossman and 
Helpman (1991), for instance, an increase in the market size allows for more varieties being 
produced, thus improving the productivity of final good producers. Holmes and Schmitz 
(2001) propose a quality ladder model, in which entrepreneurs can use their time to either 
block the innovation of their rivals or to innovate and move up the ladder. They show how 
trade shifts the relative returns from unproductive blocking towards productive innovation. 
Desmet and Parente (2006) emphasize yet another mechanism: they argue that access to larger 
markets increases the elasticity of demand, thus increasing the incentive for firms to adopt 
more productive technologies. 
 
The conventional wisdom associates foreign direct investment with higher productivity. 
According to Markusen (1995), one important stylized fact is that multinationals are prevalent 
in firms and industries with high levels of R&D, a large share of professional and technical 
workers, and products that are new and/or technically complex. This is in line with Dunning 
(1993) who argues that to overcome local barriers, multinationals must have some intangible 
assets, such as superior technologies or more advanced management techniques and those 
arguments support our empirical findings in Turkey. Markusen (1995) refers to this as 
knowledge-based assets. 
 
However, the statistical contemporaneous correlation (simultaneity) between foreign 
ownership and productivity does not settle the question of causality. Do foreign firms, through 
technology transfers, improve the productivity of the firms they acquire? Or do foreign 
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investors select more productive firms to acquire? To use the words of Evenett and Voicu 
(2002), are foreign investors picking winners or creating them? In order to answer this 
causality questions we need to have either a control group of firms or a dynamic panel of IC 
variables and therefore are out of the scope of this paper. 
 
In the case of developing countries, inward FDI may increase productivity, simply because 
foreign investors, often based in more advanced economies, dispose of more productive 
technologies. In this case, domestically owned and foreign owned firms get their productivity 
from different exogenous distributions. However, the positive contemporaneous correlation 
between foreign ownership and productivity also holds up when one focuses on FDI between 
developed countries. The recent theoretical work of Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) 
proposes a mechanism, similar to the one in Melitz (2003) that rationalizes this fact. Because 
of the fixed costs involved in setting up an affiliate plant abroad, only the most productive firm 
are able to become multinationals. Even if home firms and foreign firms get their productivity 
assigned from the same exogenous distribution, only the more productive foreign firms will 
choose to set up affiliates in the home country. This self selection issue gives rise to an 
endogenous difference in the productivity distribution of domestically owned and foreign 
owned firms. 
 
Although these theories suggest that foreign investors would tend to improve the 
productivity of the firms they acquire, recent work on FDI in developed countries suggests that 
selection bias may be a problem. This supports the view that foreign investors may be “picking 
winners”. For instance, Harris and Robinson (2003) find that in the case of the UK foreign 
firms acquire better performing local firms, without further improving productivity after 
acquisition. Benfratello and Sembenelli (2006) come to a similar conclusion in the case of 
Italy. Other studies continue to find a positive effect from foreign ownership though. Conyon 
et al. (2002), for example, estimate that UK firms get a 14% productivity boost after being 
acquired by foreign firms. 
 
Studies of foreign acquisitions in developing countries suggest self selection bias is less of 
an issue. In the case of the Czech Republic, Djankov and Hoekman (2000) and Evenett and 
Voicu (2002) both find evidence of technology transfers by foreign owners. Moreover, the 
positive impact is larger in foreign owned firms than in joint ventures. In a recent study of 
Indonesian manufacturing plants, Jens and Smarzynska (2005) use propensity score matching 
 7 
to determine what would have happened to a domestic firm had it not been acquired? They find 
a strong positive effect of foreign ownership. The increase in plant productivity is estimated to 
reach 34% three years after acquisition. 
 
In this work on Turkey we find that productivity is one of the main variables affecting 
foreign investors acquiring local firms but as in the work by Jens et al. (2005), other 
characteristics, such as infrastructures, innovation (technology licence, new product), exports 
size of the firm also matter. However, those firms that receive foreign direct investment are not 
more productive after controlling for R&D activities and human capital.  
 
Productivity has also a positive and important effect on wages. These are good news since 
improvements in productivity (TFP) are transformed in increases in wages. The elasticity is 
0.47 meaning that a one percent increases in TFP creates a 0.47 % increase in wages. 
  
Finally, a negative elasticity (-0.072) of productivity (TFP) on employment, after 
controlling for other IC variables, implies that technical change is Hicks neutral. With the same 
amount of employment and capital services it is possible to produce more output. The detailed 
explanation of the individual IC effects will be given later on. 
 
The structure of this paper is the following:  
 
2.   Data 
The pursuit of greater competitiveness and a better investment climate is leading countries -
often assisted by multilaterals such as the World Bank- to undertake their own studies, to set 
priorities for intervention and reform. The most common instrument used has been firm-level 
surveys, known as Investment Climate Surveys (ICs) from which both subjective evaluations of 
obstacles and objective hard-data numbers with direct links to costs and productivity are 
elicited and imputed.  
The Investment Climate Surveys measure firms’ experience in a range of areas related with 
the economic performance: financing, governance, corruption, crime, regulation, tax policy, 
labor relations, conflict resolution, infrastructures, supplies and marketing, quality, technology, 
and training among others; see Tables A.1 and  A.2 of appendix III. For that purpose, we 
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classify investment climate factors in five categories to evaluate the impact of each group on 
the economic performance. In the first group, says infrastructures, we include all the variables 
related with customs clearance, power and water supply, telecommunications (including phone 
connection and information technologies) and transportation. In the second group, red tape, 
corruption and crime, are included all the IC factors regarding tax rates, conflicts resolution, 
crime, bureaucracy, informalities, corruption and regulations. The next group is finance and 
corporate governance which contains factors related with governance, investments, 
informalities in payments of sales and purchases, access and cost of finance and accountability 
(or auditing). The last group of IC variables is quality, innovation and labor skills; this group 
includes the quality certifications, technology usage, product and process innovation, research 
and development, quality of the labor, training and managers’ experience and education. The 
last group –other control variables– is not properly a group of investment climate factors but a 
group of other firms’ control characteristics, we classify into this group all the factors that we 
consider may have an important impact on the economic performance but not considered as IC 
factor: exports and imports, age, FDI, number of competitors, size of the firm, etc.  
The ICs provides information on the productivity (or production function) variables, says, 
output (sales), employment, intermediate materials, capital stock and labor cost; see Table A.1 
of appendix III. The ICs does not provide information on prices at the firm level, so the 
production function variables were deflated by using the World Bank’s country specific 
Consumer Price Index, base 2000. An appendix with the definition of the variables used is 
included at the end of the paper. 
The data are from a survey of 1323 manufacturing establishments conducted in the summer 
of 2005. The panel is short in the time dimension, since includes only 2 years of productivity 
data, and has 1 year of investment climate (IC) variables. The cleaned dataset leaves a panel 
with 836 observations for each of the two years; see appendix I for a summary of the treatment 
of missing observations and Tables B2a, B2b and B3 of appendix III for the percentage of 
missing values by industry, year and region and the response rate on IC variables. For a deeper 
analysis on the effects of missing values see Escribano and Pena (2008). 
In this paper we focus on the manufacturing sector and by classifying the establishments by 
their ISIC code we end up with establishments from the next eight sectors: a) Food and 
beverages; b) Textiles and apparels; c) Chemicals; d) Non-metallic mineral products; e) 
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Metallic products f) Machinery and equipment; g) Electrical machinery; h) Transport 
equipment. 
For more details see the last section on data transformations of the Appendix. As will 
become clear later on, this region-industry transformation helps us also reducing the degree of 
endogeneity of IC variables.   
3. Evaluation of the impact of the investment climate on productivity 
We consider that productivity (P), or multifactor productivity, refers to the effects of any 
variable different from the inputs --labor (L), intermediate materials (M) and capital services 
(K)--, affecting the production (Y) process. Since there is no single salient measure of 
productivity (or logPi), any empirical evaluation on the productivity impact of IC variables 
might critically depend on the particular way productivity is measured. Therefore, to get reliable 
empirical elasticities for policy analysis, Escribano and Guasch (2005, 2008) suggest searching 
for robust empirical results using several productivity measures. This is also the approach we 
follow in this paper. However, for cross-country comparisons and other economic performance 
measures, different than TFP, we will concentrate on the IC effects on Solow’s residual. 
3.1 Two steps estimation of IC elasticities and semi-elasticities 
The first productivity analysis considered in this paper is to use the nonparametric or index 
number approach based on cost-shares from Hall (1990) to obtain the Solow´s residual (Solow, 
1957) in levels (logs) with restricted cost shares 
, , , , ,log log log log logj it L j it M j it K j it j itY s L s M s K P= + + +                                 (3.1) 
where rs  is the aggregate average cost shares from the last two years
2. We also allow the cost-
shares to vary industry by industry ( , , ,, ,j L j M j Ks s s ), yielding the unrestricted by industry Solow 
residuals. 
Once we have estimated (first step) productivity from equation (3.1) we estimate from 
equation (3.2) the investment climate (IC) elasticities and semi-elasticities by OLS (with robust 
standard errors) and by random effects obtaining two steps estimators, 
, ,log j it IC i C i Ds j DT t P j itP uIC C D D αα α α α= + + + +′ ′ ′ ′ +                                   (3.2) 
                                                 
2 When there is only firm information about a single year we take the average cost share of the firms of that 
year. 
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where ICi, Ci, Dj and Dt are (Q x 1), (M x 1), (J x 1) and (T x 1) column vectors, of investment climate 
(IC) variables, control (C) variables, country and industry dummies (Dj) and year dummies (Dt), 
respectively. The composite random-effect error term equal to it i itu vε= +  and should satisfy standard 
assumptions of random effects (RE) conditional models. That is, 
, ,
, ,
log log log ,
log log log ,
/ , , , , , , 0
/ , , , , , 0
it it it
it it it
it P i P i j t i
i P i P i j t
L M K
L M K
E v IC C D D
E IC C D D
ε
ε
  = 
  = 
 
2
, ,log log log ,/ , , , , ,it it iti P i P i j tL M Kand Var IC C D D εε σ  =  .  
Notice that we need to condition on the observable fixed effects (IC) to get the orthogonally 
condition of the inputs L, M and K. 
3.2 Single step estimation of IC elasticities and semi-elasticities 
In the second estimation strategy and to address the endogeneity problem of the inputs, we 
follow the approach proposed by Escribano and Guasch (2005, 2008). That is, we proxy the 
usually unobserved firm specific fixed effects, which is the main source of endogeneity of the 
inputs, by a long list (say 83 variables in this case) of firm specific observable time-fixed effects 
coming from the investment climate surveys (ICs). 
In particular, we form the extended Cobb-Douglas production function with restricted input-
output elasticities estimated in one step as; 
, , , , ,log log log logj it L j it M j it K j it IC i C i Ds j DT t P j itY L M K uIC C D Dα α α αα α α α= + + + + + + + +′ ′ ′ ′    (3.3) 
and similarly with the unrestricted by industry input-output elasticities of the production 
function. We also consider alternative parametric models based on the Translog functional form 
of the production function since our aim, is not to find the true model but to estimate elasticities, 
and semi-elasticities of IC variables on productivity that are robust (with equal signs and of 
similar magnitudes) to all the alternative productivity  measures considered.  
Table 1 summarizes the list of productivity measures used for the IC evaluation.3 The two 
steps estimation starts from the non-parametric approach based on cost-shares from Hall (1990) 
to obtain the Solow’s residuals in logs under two different assumptions: first, the cost shares are 
constant for all the establishments located in the same region (restricted Solow residual), and 
second the cost shares varies among industries in the same region (unrestricted by industry 
Solow residual). Once we have estimated the two productivity measures (logPi) in the first step, 
see equation (3.1), in the second step we can estimate the IC elasticities and semi-elasticities 
                                                 
3 The details of the econometric methodology are described in Escribano and Guasch (2005, 2008). 
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from equation (3.2). The advantage of the Solow residual is that it does not require neither the 
inputs (L, M, K) to be exogenous nor the input-output elasticities to be constant or 
homogeneous, see Escribano and Guasch (2005) for a further discussion. The drawback is that it 
requires having constant returns to scale (CRS) and at least competitive input markets. 
Table 1. Summary of Productivity Measures and Estimated Investment Climate (IC) Elasticities 
1. Solow´s Residual 
Two Step 
Estimation 
1.1 Restricted Coef. 
1.2 Unrestricted Coef. 
1.1.a OLS 
1.1.b  RE 
1.2.a OLS 
1.2.b RE 
2 (Pit) measures 
4 (IC) elasticities 
2. Cobb-Douglas 
Single Step  
Estimation 
2.1 Restricted Coef. 
2.2 Unrestricted Coef. 
2.1.a OLS 
2.1.b  RE 
2.2.a OLS 
2.2.b RE 
4 (Pit) measures 
4 (IC) elasticities 
3. Translog 
Single Step  
Estimation 
3.1 Restricted Coef. 
3.2 Unrestricted Coef. 
3.1.a OLS 
3.1.b  RE 
3.2.a OLS 
3.2.b RE 
4 (Pit) measures 
4 (IC) elasticities 
Total 
   
 
10 (Pit) measures 
12 (IC) elasticities 
Restricted Coef.ficints= Equal input-output elasticities in all industries.  Unrestricted Coefficients.= Different input output elasticities by industry.  OLS = Pooling 
Ordinary Least Squares estimation (with robust standard errors).  RE = Random Effects estimation. 
 
In the single step estimation approach we estimate by ordinary least squares (OLS), with 
robust standard errors, the extended production function. To address the well-known 
endogeneity problems of the inputs (L,M, and K) we follow the approach proposed by 
Escribano and Guasch (2005). That is, we proxy the usually unobserved firm specific fixed 
effects (which are the main cause of the endogeneity of the inputs) by a long list of firm specific 
observed fixed effects coming from the investment climate information. Controlling for this 
largest set of investment climate (IC) variables and plant control (C) characteristics we can get, 
under standard regularity conditions, consistent and unbiased least squares estimators of the 
parameters of the production function. In particular we use two different functional forms of the 
production function, Cobb-Douglas and Translog, under two different input-output elasticities: 
equal input-output elasticities in each industry (restricted case) and different input-output 
elasticities by industries (unrestricted case).   
Table B.5 of the Appendix shows the correlation matrix among the alternative productivity 
measures estimated by pooling the samples (ICs) from the four countries. Clearly the correlation 
can be very high (say 0.99) or very low (say 0.083). Therefore, it seems challenging to be able 
to find robust IC-productivity elasticities estimates, based on productivity measures with low 
correlation coefficient. 
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Another econometric problem that we have to face when estimating IC elasticities on TFP, is 
the endogeneity of some IC and C variables. In these productivity equations, the traditional 
dynamic instrumental variable (IV or GMM) approach is difficult to implement, given that we 
only have IC information for one year and therefore we cannot use the natural instruments for 
the inputs, like those provided by their own lags, etc. Therefore, as an alternative correction for 
the endogeneity of the IC variables, we use the region-industry-size average of the plant level 
investment climate variables ( IC ) instead of the crude IC variables, which is a common 
solution in panel data studies at the firm level4.  
The endogeneity of the IC variables is a topic that has been dealt with in the recent literature 
on investment climate. Veeramani and Goldar (2004) estimate the impact of several IC 
indicators on TFP variable by variable using the industry-location averages as instruments to 
avoid the endogeneity problem. In the same line, Hallward et al (2003) to avoid 
multicollinearity problems due to the correlation among the IC indicators proposes to use the 
industry-region averages in models with a reduced number of explanatory variables. While this 
approach avoids problems of multicollinearity, it introduces and important omitted variables 
bias. The long list of investment climate factors works as a proxy of the idiosyncratic 
differences among firms, and therefore the omission of a group of variables may introduce 
biases and inconsistencies in the estimation of the rest of the parameters of the model. As we 
have discussed before, taking industry-region-size averages is also useful to mitigate the effect 
of missing individual IC observations at the plant level, as mentioned in section 2.  
The econometric methodology applied for the selection of the variables (IC and C) goes 
from the general to the specific. The otherwise omitted variables problem that we encounter, 
starting from a too simple model, generates biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. We 
start the selection of variables with a wide set compounded by up to 97 variables, we avoid 
using at the same time variables providing the same information and likely to be correlated 
among them, mitigating the problem of multicollinearity mentioned above. We then start 
removing the less significant variables, one by one, until we obtain the final set of explanatory 
variables that are significant in at least one of the productivity measures. The main result is that 
those IC elasticity-productivity estimates vary within a reasonable range of values and with 
equal signs. Tables C.1a and C.1b of appendix III include the set of IC variables that were 
significant in at least one of the 10 productivity measure used. Notice that we always get the 
expected signs for each individual IC variable, that their signs are robust to alternative TFP 
measures and that the range of values of the estimated elasticities and semi-elasticities is 
reasonable.  
                                                 
4 This two step estimation approach has an instrumental variables (2SLS) interpretation. 
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For each significant IC variable, we represent the average values of the pooling OLS 
elasticity estimates given in Tables C.1a and C.1b of Appendix III. 
3.4   IC-Evaluation on the Average (log) Productivity. 
 
Equation (3.2), estimated by pooling OLS with a constant term, implies that the mean of the 
residuals is zero and therefore that we can evaluate the estimated regression (3.2) at their sample 
mean without including an error term. Therefore, the corresponding expression for the first term 
of the Olley and Pakes (1996) decompositions of productivity in logs becomes, 
 
                     ICˆlog ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ´ IC + jt P C Ds j DT tP C D Dα α α α α= + + +′ ′ ′                                          (3.4)  
                                                                                    
where the variables with bars indicate sample averages of each variable. Therefore, we can 
evaluate the impact of each IC  variable on average log productivity, dividing the whole 
expression by the dependent variable ,log j tP  and multiplying by 100 we get, following 





log log log log log
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ´ IC
100 100 + 100 100P
jt jt jt jt jt
Ds jC DT t
P P P P P
DC Dα αα α α
= + + +
′′ ′
                (3.5) 
 
represents the sum of the percentage productivity gains (or losses) from all the explanatory 
variables of the regression, relative to the average (log) productivity of industry j at time t. In 
particular the contribution of r component of the vector of IC variables, relative to average (log) 














If the average log productivity is not calculated across all the firms of the country, but it is 
calculated industry by industry, sector by sector, by size, by age of the firm, etc., then the 
sample mean of those residuals, , ,ˆˆ ˆ( )r it ri r itu v ε= +  from (3.2), is not exactly zero and the 
decomposition is not exact. In that case, the residual mean would also have a contribution 








3.5 Empirical Results. 
  
Numbers in Figure 1 are relative percentages computed with the absolute values of 
percentage contributions of equation (3.5); that is, Figure 1 shows in its first column the relative 
weight of each group of IC variables (with respect to the whole absolute contribution of all IC 
variables) on average log-productivity. The main group explaining average log-productivity is 
red tape, corruption and crime with a relative weight of 65%; thus, more than half log-
productivity may be explained with this group of IC variables. Next group is Infrastructures 
with 15.5%, followed by finance and corporate governance with 10%.  
 
To disentangle the impact of each group of Figure 1 variable by variable we can use Figure 
2.1, which directly reports the results obtained by applying equation (3.5) to Turkey. 
Simulations experiments to evaluate the impact of IC on TFP (and not on log TFP) can be done 
with qualitatively similar results; see Escribano et al (2008).  
 
The variables with the largest percentage contributions are Losses due to criminal activity 
(26.9%) and Sales declared to taxes (22.4%) in the red tape, corruption and crime group. Within 
infrastructures group, the largest contribution comes from Days to clear customs to import 
99.3%); External auditory (9.8%) is the only significant variable in finance and corporate 
governance group; the percentages contributions to average log-productivity in quality and 
innovation and labor skills group are lower than in other groups, only Weeks of training of 
skilled workers is over 4%; finally, in other control variables group the contributions are 
insignificant.  
 
Figure 3.1 reports the results obtained from applying equation (3.5) by sizes instead of at the 
aggregate level. There is not a significant difference among sizes. 
4. IC assessments on economic performance: employment, real wages, 
exports and FDI  
Since in the previous section on productivity we found robust results for all the ten 
productivity measures used, in what follows, we will concentrate on the analysis of only one 
productivity (TFP) measure5; the restricted Solow´s residuals.  
                                                 
5  It is interesting to use always the same measure of TFP, to allow for cross-country TFP comparisons; see 
Escribano et al. (2008). 
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In order to estimate the impact of IC and C variables on several measures of economic 
performance, controlling for TFP, we use the following simultaneous equations system; 
  
, , ,IC i P,ilog (´ IC + v )j it P P j itC i Ds j DT tP C D Dα εα α α α= + + + +′ ′ ′ +                                  (4.1) 
, , IC i Exp,i , ,´ IC + (v )log
Exp
j it Exp P j it C i Ds j DT t Exp j ity C D DP δ δδ δ εδ δ ′ ′+ +′+ + += +             (4.2)                                                                            
, , IC i FDI,i , ,log ´  IC  + (v )
FDI
j it FDI P j it C i Ds j DT t FDI j ity C D DP ρ ρρ ρ ερ ρ ′ ′+ +′+ + += +          (4.3)                                 
j,it L P j,it w j,it L i C i L,i L,j,itLogL =  + logP + logW + ´ IC  + ´ C + + (v + )Ds j DT tD Dγγ γ γ γ γ γ ε′+′         (4.4) 
j,it W P j,it IC i C i W,i W,j,itLogW  =   + logP ´ IC  + ´ C + + (v + )Ds j DT tD Dββ β β β β ε′+′+         (4.5) 
 
Notice that since the variable yr j,it, with r = Exp or FDI, is a binary random variable taking 
only 0 and 1 values, then , ,1( ) ( / )
r r
j it j ity xP E y x= = , the conditional probability is equal to the 
conditional expectation which is usually assumed to follow a PROBIT or a LOGIT model, and 
the conditional variance (heteroskedasticity) is equal to the product of the conditional 
probabilities of the two events. In general, the linear probability models (LPM) approximate 
well the PROBIT and LOGIT nonlinear models when the variables are evaluated at their sample 
means. The treatment of PROBIT and LOGIT models with endogenous explanatory variables 
has no well established solution. However, since we are interested in the mean IC contribution 
relative to the mean values of the dependent variables, we will concentrate on linear probability 
specifications, like (4.2) and (4.3). The main advantage of the LPM is that the endogeneity of 
the regressors can be addressed by standard instrumental variables (IV) approaches like 2SLS or 
GMM. 
We would like to assume that the error terms of each equation (vr,i+εr,j,it) are uncorrelated 
with all the explanatory variables of each equation r, where r=P, Exp, FDI, W and L. However, 
for certain explanatory variables of the system this exogeneity6 conditions are not satisfied. The 
endogeneity of certain IC variables induces a correlation between those IC variables and the 
errors (vr,i+εr,j,it) of the system of equations (4.1) to (4.5) and creates simultaneous equation 
biases and inconsistencies in least squares estimators, like pooling OLS or in random effects 
(RE) estimators. This correlation is in general mitigated by replacing those plant-level IC 
variables by their region-industry averages ( jIC ), as we have seen before. However, for some 
other explanatory variables like productivity, wages, exports and FDI, the endogeneity is 
                                                 
6 See the orthogonality conditions discussed after equation (3.2). 
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intrinsic due to the simultaneous structure of the system of equations. Therefore, when 
necessary, we will estimate each equation by instrumental variables (IV) techniques based on 
two stages least squares (2SLS) procedures using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. We 
could have used 3SLS, which is more efficient than 2SLS under correct specification of each 
equation of the system. However, since with system of equations estimation techniques the 
misspecification of one equation affects the whole system, the results obtained from 2SLS are 
more robust.  
To discuss the identification issues underlying the system of equations proposed it is useful 
to apply matrix notation. The structural form of the system (4.1) - (4.5) is given by 
t t t
Αy +Βx = u                                                                          (4.6) 
where 
t
y  is the 5 1×  vector of observations of dependent variables (log-productivity, Expity  and 
FDI
ity , log-employment and log-wages); tx  is the 97 1×  vector of observations on the 
exogenous/endogenous variables (ICi, Ci, Dj and Dt); tu  is the 5 1×  vector of errors; Α  is a 
5 5×  matrix of coefficients of simultaneous dependent variables; Β  is a 5 97×  matrix of 
coefficients of the exogenous/endogenous variables.  
In the system (4.1) - (4.5), we are imposing certain structure; for example that employment 
has no direct effect in any other equation of the system and that real wages only affects 
employment demand, after controlling for all IC and C variables. Therefore, we can explicitly 
write the first term of (4.6) as; 
 
, , , ,
, ,
, ,
, , , ,
, , ,
1 0 0 log log
1 0 0




P Exp P FDI it it P Exp it P FDI it
Exp
Exp P Exp FDI it
FDI
FDI P FDI Exp it
L P L Exp L FDI L W it
W P W Exp W FDI it
a a P P a y a y
a a y
a a y
a a a a L
a a a W
− − − −  
  
− −  
  − −≡ ≡
  
− − − −  
  













it Exp P it Exp FDI it
FDI Exp
it FDI P it FDI Exp it
Exp FDI
it L P it L W it L Exp it L FDI it
Exp FDI
it W P it W Exp it W FDI it
y a P a y
y a P a y
L a P a W a y a y







− − − − 
 
− − − 
. 
 
The rank condition is a necessary and sufficient condition for the system (4.6) to be 
identified. To discuss whether the rank condition is satisfied, say, in the first equation, let ′α  be 
the first row of Α  and ′β  the first row of Β . We may now partition these vectors into two 
components corresponding to the included ( 1′α and ′1β ) variables and excluded ( 2′α  and 2′β ) 


















, which allow us 
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. By the rank condition, productivity equation is 
identified if ( ) 5 1rank = −D . The same holds for the rest of equations of the system. Thus, even 
if we have several exclusion restrictions in matrix Α  (in the productivity, wages and 
employment equations), nevertheless these restrictions are not enough to ensure the rank 
condition to be satisfied, for more details on the particular extra identification conditions 
imposed see Appendix II.  
The empirical results based on 2SLS pooling the ICs from turkey are included in Tables D.1 
to D.4 of the Appendix III. In all the cases we found that TFP has a significant impact on 
employment demand (negative), real wages (positive), and on the probabilities of exporting 
(positive) or receiving FDI (positive), even after controlling for IC variables. 
5.   IC-Evaluation on the Average Value of Each Dependent Variable 
The objective now is to measure the partial direct effect of each IC variable on each 
dependent variable at different aggregation levels (aggregate level, sector by sector, region by 
region, by size of the firm, by age of the firm, etc.). For that purpose, we evaluate the impact of 
the average IC variable on the sample average values of the dependent variables (employment, 
wages, exports, FDI,). In what follows, we substitute all the unknown parameters from the 
system (4.1) to (4.5) by their corresponding 2SLS estimated values.  
Labor demand equation; 
, , , IC












= ∑ . 
, , IC
, , , , , , ,
ˆˆ ˆ
100 100 100 100 100 100 100
log log log log log log log
ˆ ˆlog log ˆˆ
100
P j it W j it Ds jC DT tL
j it j it j it j it j it j it j it
DIC C D
L L L L L L L
P W γγ γγ γ γγ ′′ ′
+ + +
′
















= ∑ . 
, IC
, , , , , ,
ˆˆ ˆ
100 100 100 100 100 100 100
log log log log log log
ˆˆ ˆlog
P j it Ds jW C DT t
j it j it j it j it j it j it
DIC C D
W W W W W W
P ββ βββ β ′′ ′
+ + +
′
= + +               (5.2b) 
 
Since Expity  is a binary variable, evaluating the impact at the sample mean implies the 
evaluation on the probability (frequency) of exporting. In particular the equation (4.4) 
evaluated at the sample mean becomes 
, IC











= ∑f . From equation (5.3a) we can, as we did previously, 
evaluate the impact of the average IC variables on the probability of exporting, 
IC
, , , , , ,
ˆˆ ˆIC
100 100 100 100 100 100
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( 0) ( 0) ( 0) ( 0) ( 0) ( 0)
ˆ ˆ ˆlog
Exp P jt Ds jC DT t
j t j t j t j t j t j t
DC D
P Exp P Exp P Exp P Exp P Exp P Exp




f f f f f f
.                (5.3b)                                                                            
 
Similarly, FDIity  is also a binary variable, therefore evaluating the impact at their sample 
mean implies evaluating the impact on the probability (frequency) of receiving foreign direct 
investment. In particular the equation (4.5) evaluated at the sample mean becomes (5.4a). 
    
, IC C Ds DT
ˆ( 0) ICˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆlog
j t FDI P jt j t











= ∑f . From equation (5.4a) we can, as we did previously, 
evaluate the impact of the average IC variables on the probability of receiving foreign direct 
investment. 
DsIC C DT
, , , , , ,
100
ˆ ˆlog ˆ ˆ ˆˆ IC
100 100 100 100 100
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( 0) ( 0) ( 0) ( 0) ( 0) ( 0)
P jt j tFDI
j t j t j t j t j t j t
P DC D
P FDI P FDI P FDI P FDI P FDI P FDI
ρ ρρ ρ ρρ
+ + += + +
′′ ′ ′
f f f f f f





5.1 Empirical Results in the Employment Equation 
 
Second column of Figure 1 summarizes results obtained from applying equation (5.1b) to 
Turkey. As in log-productivity section, red tape, corruption and crime (45.%) is dominating the 
average log-employment decomposition. Finance and corporate governance (17.5%), quality, 
innovation and labor skills (14.8%) and real wages (13.53%) are the next groups in order of 
relative importance. 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the result obtained for each term of equation (5.1b). Labor costs declared 
has the highest contribution with 20.7, in the same group Sales declared to taxes and 
Transaction fees to obtain a land or a building have also considerable contributions to average 
log-employment. Dummy for rent land has the largest contributions among finance and 
corporate governance variables with 5.6%. There are six variables in the quality, innovation 
and labor skills group, having Education of the manager the largest contribution, concretely 
4.8%. In what refers to other control variables the largest contributions come from Dummy for 
exporter with 2.6%. Finally, real wages matters enormously when explaining average 
productivity, explaining by itself 13.3% of average log-employment. 
  
Decomposition by size is in Figures 5.2. Main issues are: the demand for labor in large 
firms is more likely to be affected by quality innovation and labor skills variables and less by 
red tape, corruption and crime variables.  
 
5.2 Empirical Results in the Real Wage Equation 
 
From Figure 1, third column, it is clear that Red tape, corruption and crime is the more 
important group when explaining real wages (37.5%). Infrastructures, other control variables 
and productivity have also considerable contributions with 16.8%, 16.4% and 14.3% 
respectively. 
 
Figure 2.3 breaks down the results for real wages of Figure 1 variable by variable. 
Productivity is the second most important variable with 14.3% contribution to average log-
wage. Within Infrastructure variables Internet page has the largest contribution with 7.8%. Red 
tape, corruption and crime is the key group explaining log-wage with four variables 
characterized by large contributions: Security expenses with 15.3%, Manager’s time spent in 
bureaucratic issues with 12.5%, Labor cost declared with 7.9% and Absenteeism with 1.8%. 
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Contributions of Finance and corporate governance variables are low; the only significant 
contribution within this group comes from Dummy for rent buildings being 6.6%. The same 
occurs with quality, innovation and labor skills group, only Training unskilled workers has a 
contribution equal to 5%. Four IC variables are in the group other control variables, 
Competitors is the key variable of this group contributing with 12.5% to average log-wage. 
 
Regarding the decomposition by size (Figure 3.3) the results are almost homogeneous.  
 
5.3 Empirical Results in the Exports Equation 
 
Red tape, corruption and crime is again the key group of variables affecting the probability 
of exporting in Turkey as Figure 1 in its fourth column shows, being its relative percentage 
contribution among all IC variables 36.2%. Nevertheless, other control variables (21.9%), 
infrastructures (19.4) and productivity (13.4%) have an important relative contribution too. 
Quality, innovation and labor skills (7.1%) and finance and corporate governance (2.1%) 
relative importance is lower.  
 
Figure 2.4 breaks down groups of fourth column of Figure 1 in key components. Within 
infrastructures group the more prominent contribution to the probability of exporting comes 
from Number of power outages (10.3%). Security expenses variable has the largest impact 
within Red tape, corruption and crime variables (27.7%) and Number of competitors within 
other control variables (11.8%). Productivity has a clear positive impact on the probability of 
exporting, being its percentage contribution 19.4%. In what refers to labor relations, quality 
and innovation and finance and corporate governance, only the contribution of Education of 
the manager exceeds 3%. 
 
The decomposition of the probability of exporting performed by size highlights some 
differences among groups. The probability of exporting in large firms is more likely to be 
affected by finance and corporate governance and quality innovation and labor skills variables. 
However, these firms are less affected by red tape, corruption and crime variables. 
 
5.4 Empirical Results in the FDI Equation 
 
Quality, innovation and labor skills is the key group of variables affecting the probability of 
receiving FDI in Turkey, which relative importance is 38.9%, as Figure 1 shows. The second 
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group of variables is productivity followed by infrastructures; the gap between these two 
groups and quality, innovation and labor skills is considerable, being their contributions. The 
role of red tape, corruption and crime and other control variables is in this case lower than in 
previous equations.  
 
To decompose the groups of fifth column of Figure 1 in key variables we include Figure 
2.5. The impact of IC factors on the probability of receiving FDI can be summarized in six key 
variables. The largest positive impact comes from Dummy for internal training (18.2%), 
whereas the main variable affecting negatively FDI is Days to clear custom to import (17%). 
Productivity has a key role being its effect on FDI large and positive (17.8%). Education of the 
manager and Dummy for new product variables within the quality, innovation and labor skills 
group, have important impacts, 17.6% and 12.7% respectively. Although red tape, corruption 
and crime group has a minor importance when compared with other groups, the only 
significant variable of this group contributes by itself with 9.7% of the probability of receiving 
FDI.    
 
When the decomposition is performed by sizes we do not obtain significant differences 
among groups.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
We believe that improving the investment climate (IC) is a key policy instrument to 
promote economic growth and to mitigate the institutional, legal, economic and social factors 
that are constraining the convergence of per capita income and labor productivity of Turkey 
relative to more developed countries. 
 
In this paper, we identify the main investment climate variables that affect economic 
performance measures like total factor productivity, employment, wages, exports and foreign 
direct investment. We extend the productivity methodology of Escribano and Guasch (2005, 
2008) and Escribano et al. (2008), based on the analysis of how the investment climate affect 
productivity, to other economic performance measures. We have proposed a system of five 
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simultaneous equations to analyze the interactions between TFP and other economic 
performance measures.  
 
We found that TFP is a key variable explaining other important economic decisions for the 
firm, like employment demand, wages, exports and FDI, even after controlling for the 
investment climate environment. 
 
From the analysis of Firm’s perceptions, we identify the block of red tape, corruption and 
crime as the main IC block creating severe obstacles for firm economic performance. The main 
individual IC bottlenecks are taxes and tax administration. The second and third IC blocks are 
finance and the block of quality innovation and labor skills. Within the infrastructure block 
firms’ perceive that the main elements are customs, trade regulations and electricity. 
 
The Doing Business report (2007), DBR, identifies three main problems; dealing with 
licenses and closing a business, employing workers, paying taxes and trading across borders. 
 
From our econometric analysis we observe similar results since red tape, corruptions and 
crime is the main issue in terms of productivity, employment wages and exports. The main IC 
variables form this group are the manager’s time spent in bureaucratic issues and taxes. The 
employment effects are stronger for small firms. This is also consistent with the DBR. The 
main econometric effect on productivity from the IC block on infrastructures is also the 
number of days to clear customs for imports. 
 
TFP in Turkey´s manufacturing firms is very important to enhance international trade. Not 
only it affects the capacity of firms to export but also affects the probability of the firms to 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI). In fact, for FDI the most important IC block is quality, 
innovation and labor skills. The two main individual elements are the education of the manager 
and the internal training done t the firm level. The quality of infrastructure in Turkey also 
affects the probability of exporting with the number of power outages being the main 
individual determinant followed by the days to clear customs for exports and the fact that firm 
uses e-mail. Finally, from the econometric analysis, we also find that for attracting FDI the 
main bottleneck in infrastructures has to do with the time to clear customs for imports. 
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We conclude that for policy analysis it is very useful to combine different sources of 
information; firm perceptions on bottlenecks, ease of doing business conclusions form DBR 
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Appendix I: Data Transformations 
 
The IC survey of Turkey has a large amount of zeros and missing values, especially in 
the production function variables (see Table B.1). Therefore, in order to keep as many 
observations as possible, to benefit us of the law of the large numbers, we decided to replace 
the certain missing values- for a deeper analysis on missing values in ICs see Escribano and 
Pena (2008). The data transforming process is the following: 
 
Step 1: Previous transformations. We dropped those plants with either zeros or missing values 
in all of the production function variables. In addition, we also dropped all plants with either 
zeros or missing values in sales, materials and capital stock. For the remaining missing values 
we followed steps 2 and 3. 
 
Step 2: Data transformation. We began by stratifying original sample into sub-groups in order 
to compute the median of production function variables for each group, the remaining missing 
values would be then replaced by these medians. Notice that the smaller the sub-groups we 
create, the more variability will be in the sample for each IC variable. There is a trade-off 
between the representativity of the sample used and number of observations available in each 
group (cell). For some sub-groups, we could not compute the median because there were no 
observations in that cell and we had considered larger groups. If the problem persists, we 
proceed to create a larger sub-group. We repeat this stratification process three times: 
 
A. By Industry, region and size of the firms: eight industries, five regions and five sizes, 200 
sub-groups. 
B. By industry and region: forty sub-groups. 
C. By industry: eight sub-groups. 
 
Step 3: Final transformations. Final step simply consists of excluding the outliers, defined as 








































































































Appendix II: Identification Restrictions 
 
The restricted variables and the equations in which their coefficients are restricted to take 
value 0 are listed in what follows, in brackets are the substitutive variables:  
 
a) Productivity equation: Transaction fees to obtain a land or a building (
TrsFees
b ) (Payments 
to government or private parties to obtain a land or a building, Delay to obtain a land or a 
building), Average duration of water outages (
AvDurWatOut
b ) (Water outages), Internet page 
(
IntPage
b ) (E-mail), Criminal attempts (
CrAtt
b ) (Losses due to criminal activity), Payments to 
obtain a contract with the government (
PayContrGov
b ) (Payments to deal with bureaucratic issues 
and Manager’s time spent in bureaucratic issues). With the restrictions applied on productivity 
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b) Employment demand equation: Days to clear customs to import ( ImDsCstm pb ) (Days to 
clear customs to export), Water outages ( WatOutb ) (Average duration of water outages), Internet 
page ( IntPageb ) (E-mail), Illegal payments for protection ( PrIllPay otb ) (Losses due to criminal 
activity and Criminal attempts), Licensed technology ( LicTechb ) (New technology purchased), 
Training unskilled workers ( TrUskWrksb ) (Weeks of training unskilled workers) and Power 
outages ( PowOutb ) (Average duration of Power outages). Matrix D for employment demand 
equation is 
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c) Real Wages equation: Days to clear customs to import ( ImDsCstm pb ) (Days to clear 
customs to export), Power outages ( PowOutb ) (Average duration of Power outages), E-mail 
( Emailb ) (Internet page), Illegal payments for protection ( PrIllPay otb ) (Losses due to criminal 
activity and Criminal attempts), Loan ( Loanb ) (Loan outstanding) and Transaction fees to obtain 
a land or a building ( TrsFeesb ) (Payments to government or private parties to obtain a land or a 
building, Delay to obtain a land or a building). Matrix D is in this case 
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Exp DsCstm p Exp PowOut Exp Email Exp IllPay ot
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d) Probability of exporting equation: Internet page ( IntPageb ) (E-mail), Water outages 
( WatOutb ) (Average duration of water outages), Payments to obtain a contract with the 
government ( PayContrGovb ) (Payments to deal with bureaucratic issues and Manager’s time spent 
in bureaucratic issues), Illegal payments for protection ( PrIllPay otb ) (Criminal attempts, Losses 
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e) Probability of receiving FDI equation: Average duration of water outages ( AvDurWatOutb ) 
(Water outages), E-mail ( Emailb ) (Internet page), Transaction fees to obtain a land or a building 
( TrsFeesb ) (Payments to government or private parties to obtain a land or a building, Delay to 
obtain a land or a building), Manager’s time spent in bureaucratic issues ( MngTmBurb ) (Payments 
to deal with bureaucratic issues and Payments to obtain a contract with the government) and 
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Losses due to criminal activity ( LossCrActb ) (Illegal payments for protection and Criminal 
attempts). Matrix D for this case becomes  
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Appendix III: Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table A.1:  General Information at Plant Level and Production Function Variables.1 
Industrial classification a) food and beverages; b) textiles and wearing 
apparel; c) chemical products, petroleum, coal, 
rubber and plastics; d) non-metallic metal 
products; e) fabricated metal products, excluding 
machinery and equipment; f) machinery and 
equipment, excluding electrical; g) electrical 
machinery apparatus, appliances and supplies; h) 
transport equipment.  
General Information 
at Plant Level 
Regional classification a) Marmara; b)  Ege; c) Ic Anadolu; d) Akdeniz; e) 
Karadeniz (Dogu Anadolu).  
Sales Used as the measure of output for the production 
function estimation. Sales are defined as total 
annual sales. The series are deflated by using the 
Producer Price Indexes (PPI), base 2000. 
Employment Total number of permanent and temporal 
workers.  
Total hours worked per year Total number of employees multiplied by the 
average hours worked per year. 
Materials Total costs of intermediate and raw materials 
used in production (excluding fuel). The series are 
deflated by using the Producer Price Indexes 
(PPI), base 2000. 
Capital stock Net book value of machinery and equipment. The 
series are deflated by using the Producer Price 
Indexes (PPI), base 2000. 
User cost of capital The user cost of capital is defined in terms of the 
opportunity cost of using capital; it is defined as a 




Labor cost Total expenditures on personnel. The series are 
deflated by using the Producer Price Indexes 
(PPI), base 2000. 
Exports Dummy variable that takes value 1 if exports are 
greater than 10%.  
Foreign Direct Investment Dummy variable that takes value 1 if any part of 
the capital of the firm is foreign. 
Wages Real wage is defined as the total expenditures on 
personnel (deflated by using the Producer Price 
Indexes (PPI), base 2000.) divided by the total 







Employment Total number of permanent and temporal 
workers.  
















Table A.2 (I): Investment climate (IC) and control (C) variables 
Blocks of ICAs  Name of the variable Description of the variable 
Days to clear customs for exports Average number of days to clear customs to export (log). 
Days to clear customs for imports  Average number of days to clear customs to imports (log). 
Average duration of power outages Average duration of power outages suffered by the plant in 
hours (log). 
Losses due to power outages Value of the losses due to the power outages as a percentage 
of sales (conditional on the plant reporting power outages). 
Number of power outages Number of power outages suffered by the plant in 2003 (log). 
Average duration of water outages Average duration of water outages suffered by the plant in 
hours (log). 
Number of water outages Number of water outages suffered by the plant in 2003 (log). 
Losses due to water outages Value of the losses due to the water outages as a percentage 
of sales (conditional on the plant reporting water outages). 
Wait for phone Actual delay to obtain a phone connection in days (log). 
Wait for electricity connection Actual delay to obtain a electricity connection in days (log). 
Wait for water connection Actual delay to obtain a water connection in days (log). 
Wait for health certification Actual delay to obtain a health certification in days (log). 
Shipment losses Fraction of the value of the plant’s average cargo consignment 
that was lost in transit due to breakage, theft, spoilage or other 
deficiencies of the transport means used. 
Dummy for email Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant uses email.   
Dummy for internet page Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has a website.  
Infrastructures 
Dummy for electronic invoice 
system 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant uses an 
























Table A.2 (II): Investment climate (IC) and control (C) variables 
Blocks of ICAs  Name of the variable Description of the variable 
Dummy for criminal activity Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant suffered 
any criminal attempt during 2003. 
Losses due to criminal activity Value of losses due to criminal activity (log). 
Security expenses Cost in security (equipment, staff, etc) (log). 
Illegal payments for protection Cost due to protection payments e. g. to organized 
crime to prevent violence (bribery) (log). 
Dummy for consulting  Dummy variable that takes value 1if the firm uses 
consultants or employments to help deal with 
bureaucratic issues. 
Dummy for payments to deal with 
bureaucratic issues 
Dummy that takes value 1 if firms in the main sector 
occasionally need to give gifts or make informal 
payments to  public officers in order to “get things 
done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, 
legislations, services, etc. 
Manager’s time spent in 
bureaucratic issues 
Percentage of managers' time spent in dealing with 
bureaucratic issues. 
Dummy for informal competition Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm competes 
with informal (no registered) firms. 
Sales declared to taxes Percentage of total sales declared to taxes. 
Labor costs declared Percentage of workforce declared to taxes. 
Number of inspections In the last year, total number of inspections (log). 
Dummy for payments to obtain a 
contract with the government 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if in plant's sector it 
is common to pay an extra amount of money in order to 
obtain a contract with the government. 
Conflicts with clients Percentage of conflicts with clients solved in the courts 
in the last two years. 
Average duration of conflicts Average weeks that take to resolve a conflict from the 
moment the case was brought to court until the 
moment the court decided the case. 
Absenteeism Days of production lost due to absenteeism (log). 
Wait for a construction related 
permit 
Actual delay to obtain a construction related in days 
(log). 
Wait for a main operating license Actual delay to obtain a main operating license in days 
(log). 
Dummy for new land or building Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm acquired 
or attempted to acquire new land or buildings to 
expand operations in the previous 3 years. 
Delay to obtain a land or a building Total time that took from the moment the firm decided 
to buy a new land or building to the moment the firm 
finally got it (Including all the time required for official 
registration, negotiations with the seller and obtaining 
all licenses and necessary development permits and 
excluding the time needed for the construction 
permits).  
Transaction fees to obtain a land 
or a building 
Total cost related with transaction fees (including 
registration fees, payments to lawyers, brokers, etc) to 
obtain a land or a building.  
Payment to government or private 
parties to obtain a land or a 
building 
Total cost in informal payments to government officials 
or private parties to obtain a new land or buildings 
Dummy for contract enforcement Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the conflict of the 
firm with clients solved in courts were generally 
enforced. 
Dummy for alternative resolution of 
conflicts 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm attempted 
to use alternative ways of resolution of conflicts with 
clients (e.g. arbitration or mediation). 
Dummy for lawsuit Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has been 
involved in a lawsuit in the last three years. 
Delayed payments Percentage of monthly total sales to private customers 




Sales never repaid Percentage of monthly total sales to private customers 




Table A.2 (III): Investment climate (IC) and control (C) variables 
Blocks of ICAs  Name of the variable Description of the variable 
Dummy for credit line Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant reports 
that it has a credit line. 
Dummy for loan Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant reports 
that it has a bank loan. 
Dummy for loan outstanding Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has a loan 
outstanding from a financial institution. 
Dummy for loan bank Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has a loan 
from a domestic private commercial banks. 
Dummy for loan leasing Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has a loan 
from a leasing arrangement. 
Dummy for loan public Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has a loan 
from a state owned banks. 
Dummy for loan informal Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has a loan 
from Informal sources (e.g. money lender). 
Dummy for loan DOT Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm has a loan 
from the Small and Medium Sized Industry Development 
Organization of Turkey (Incentive Credit for Export)  
Dummy for loan Turkish Lira Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the loan is 
denominated in Turkish Lira. 
Dummy for loan foreign currency Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the loan is 
denominated in a foreign currency. 
Dummy for loan with collateral Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the loan is on 
collateral. 
Dummy for loan long term Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the duration of the 
loan is more than 12 months. 




































Table A.2 (IV): Investment climate (IC) and control (C) variables 
Blocks of ICAs  Name of the variable Description of the variable 
Dummy for quality certification Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has a quality 
certification. 
Dummy for new product Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant has developed 
a new product or product line. 
Dummy for product upgraded Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant upgraded an 
existing product last year. 
Dummy for new technology 
purchased 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm purchased any 
new technology during last year. 
Dummy for licensed technology Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm used a licensed 
technology of a foreign company in the last year. 
Dummy for education of the 
manager 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the manager of the 
plant has a bachelor or higher education degree. 
Conflicts with employees Times in the last year the firm was taken to court by its 
current and former employees 
Duration of conflicts with 
employees 
Average weeks that take to resolve a conflict with an 
employee from the moment the case was brought to court 
until the moment the court decided the case. 
Staff-skilled workers Percentage of skilled workers in firm's staff. 
Staff-unskilled workers Percentage of unskilled workers in firm's staff. 
Staff-professional workers Percentage of professional workers in firm's staff. 
Staff-part time workers Percentage of part time workers in firm's staff. 
Staff-female workers Percentage of female workers in firm's staff. 
Staff-temporal workers Percentage of temporal workers in firm's staff. 
Dummy for internal training Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant provides 
internal training to its employees. 
Dummy for external training Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant provides 
external training to its employees. 
Training skilled workers  Percentage of skilled workers that received training during 
last year.  
Training unskilled workers  Percentage of unskilled workers that received training during 
last year. 
Weeks of training of skilled workers Number of weeks of training received by the skilled workers 
during last year. 
Weeks of training of unskilled 
workers 
Number of weeks of training received by the unskilled 
workers during last year. 
Staff-university  Percentage of staff with at least one year of university. 
Staff-middle education Percentage of staff with completed high school (11 years) or 


























Table A.2 (V): Investment climate (IC) and control (C) variables 
Blocks of ICAs  Name of the variable Description of the variable 
Dummy for incorporated company Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant is an 
incorporated company. 
Dummy for public Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm belongs to the 
government. 
Dummy for foreign direct 
investment 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 if any part of the capital 
of the firm is foreign. 
Age of the firm Difference between the year that the plant started operations 
and current year. 
Number of competitors Number of competitors in the main market (log). 
Dummy for exporter Dummy variable that takes value 1 if exports are greater 
than 10%.  
Dummy for importer Dummy variable that takes value 1 if imports are greater 
than 10%.  
Percentage of capacity utilization Average percentage of capacity used during last year. 
Dummy for holding company Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm belongs to a 
holding company. 
Market share Market share of the firm (percentage). 
Competitive pressure Categorical variable that takes value 1 if the number of 
competitors in firm's main market has increased during last 
year. 
Percentage of workforce unionized Percentage of workers that belongs to a syndicate. 
Strikes Days of production lost due to strikes (log). 
Dummy for rent land Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant rents almost 
all its lands. 
Dummy for rent buildings Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the plant rents almost 
all its buildings. 
Dummy for ownership Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm previously 
belonged to the government. 
Dummy for industrial zone Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm is located in an 
industrial zone. 
Dummy for foreign competition Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm competes with 
foreign firms. 
Small Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm employs 49 
workers or less. 
Médium Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm employs more 
than 49 workers and less or equal than 249. 
Large Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm employs 250 
workers or more. 
















Table B.1: Total Number of Observations, Missing Values and Zeros for Production Function 
Variables in the Original Sample (2003-2004). 
  
Sales Materials Capital Employment Labor Cost 
Total number of observations for each year 2003-2004. 1323 1323 1323 1323 1323 
(1.A) Missing Values 2003 480 591 518 67 583 
(1.B) Missing Values 2004 450 550 496 30 532 
(2.A) Zeroes 2003 23 68 299 18 39 
(2.B) Zeroes 2004 0 54 189 3 21 
(3.A) Total number of observations not available 2003: 
(1.A)+(2.A) 503 659 817 85 622 
(3.B) Total number of observations not available 2004: 
(1.B)+(2.B) 450 604 685 33 553 
(4.A) Observations available 2003: (5.A)-(3.A) 820 664 506 1238 701 
(4.B) Observations available 2004: (5.B)-(3.B) 873 719 638 1290 770 
Final number of observations for each year after correction 
for outliers1 1323 1323 1323 1323 1323 
1 See the appendix of data transformation for a description of the methodology used to deal with outliers and to replace missing 

































Table B.2a: Representativeness of production function variables before and after cleaning 
missing values and outliers; by industry and region. 
Region Marmara Ege Ic Anadolu Akdeniz Karadeniz Total 
Industry #Obs. Perc. #Obs. Perc. #Obs. Perc. #Obs. Perc. #Obs. Perc. #Obs. Perc. 
Original 
Sample 208 7.9 126 4.8 160 6.0 42 1.6 28 1.1 564 21.3 
Without 




replacing 100 6.0 88 5.3 130 7.8 38 2.3 18 1.1 374 22.4 
Original 
Sample 536 20.3 100 3.8 28 1.1 44 1.7 30 1.1 738 27.9 
Without 





replacing 264 15.8 66 3.9 14 0.8 32 1.9 20 1.2 396 23.7 
Original 
Sample 186 7.0 44 1.7 58 2.2 40 1.5 24 0.9 352 13.3 
Without 
replacing 44 4.5 16 1.6 26 2.6 26 2.6 7 0.7 119 12.1 
Chemicals 
With 
replacing 90 5.4 26 1.6 42 2.5 36 2.2 12 0.7 206 12.3 
Original 
Sample 38 1.4 28 1.1 44 1.7 28 1.1 28 1.1 166 6.3 
Without 






replacing 18 1.1 26 1.6 26 1.6 24 1.4 20 1.2 114 6.8 
Original 
Sample 124 4.7 24 0.9 78 2.9 32 1.2 26 1.0 284 10.7 
Without 
replacing 25 2.5 20 2.0 50 5.1 20 2.0 16 1.6 131 13.3 
Metal 
products    
(ex.  M&E) 
With 
replacing 66 3.9 20 1.2 64 3.8 28 1.7 24 1.4 202 12.1 
Original 
Sample 74 2.8 38 1.4 80 3.0 36 1.4 28 1.1 256 9.7 
Without 





replacing 32 1.9 24 1.4 70 4.2 32 1.9 22 1.3 180 10.8 
Original 
Sample 50 1.9 24 0.9 22 0.8 24 0.9 14 0.5 134 5.1 
Without 




replacing 30 1.8 22 1.3 18 1.1 22 1.3 8 0.5 100 6.0 
Original 
Sample 40 1.5 32 1.2 36 1.4 34 1.3 10 0.4 152 5.7 
Without 




replacing 20 1.2 12 0.7 28 1.7 32 1.9 8 0.5 100 6.0 
Original 
Sample 1,256 47.5 416 15.7 506 19.1 280 10.6 188 7.1 2,646 100.0 
Without 
replacing 270 27.4 208 21.1 295 30.0 210 21.3 99 10.1 1,082 110.0 
Total 
With 














Table B.2b: Percentage of observations lost due to missing values; by industry and region. 
 















Sample 208  126  160  42  28  564  
Without 




replacing 100 51.9 88 30.2 130 18.8 38 9.5 18 35.7 374 33.7 
Original 
Sample 536  100  28  44  30  738  
Without 





replacing 264 50.7 66 34.0 14 50.0 32 27.3 20 33.3 396 46.3 
Original 
Sample 186  44  58  40  24  352  
Without 
replacing 44 76.3 16 63.6 26 55.2 26 35.0 7 70.8 119 66.2 
Chemicals 
With 
replacing 90 51.6 26 40.9 42 27.6 36 10.0 12 50.0 206 41.5 
Original 
Sample 38  28  44  28  28  166  
Without 






replacing 18 52.6 26 7.1 26 40.9 24 14.3 20 28.6 114 31.3 
Original 
Sample 124  24  78  32  26  284  
Without 
replacing 25 79.8 20 16.7 50 35.9 20 37.5 16 38.5 131 53.9 
Metal 
products    
(ex.  M&E) 
With 
replacing 66 46.8 20 16.7 64 17.9 28 12.5 24 7.7 202 28.9 
Original 
Sample 74  38  80  36  28  256  
Without 





replacing 32 56.8 24 36.8 70 12.5 32 11.1 22 21.4 180 29.7 
Original 
Sample 50  24  22  24  14  134  
Without 




replacing 30 40.0 22 8.3 18 18.2 22 8.3 8 42.9 100 25.4 
Original 
Sample 40  32  36  34  10  152  
Without 




replacing 20 50.0 12 62.5 28 22.2 32 5.9 8 20.0 100 34.2 
Original 
Sample 1,256  416  506  280  188  2,646  
Without 
replacing 270 78.5 208 50.0 295 41.7 210 25.0 99 47.3 1,082 59.1 
Total 
With 
replacing 620 50.6 284 31.7 392 22.5 244 12.9 132 29.8 1672 36.8 
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Table B.3 (I): Total number of observations and response rate of IC and C variables in the original 
sample 
Blocks of ICAs  Name of the variable #Observations Response rate 
Days to clear customs for exports 1358 51.3 
Days to clear customs for imports  898 33.9 
Average duration of power outages 2466 93.2 
Losses due to power outages 2324 87.8 
Number of power outages 2500 94.5 
Average duration of water outages 2498 94.4 
Number of water outages 2512 94.9 
Losses due to water outages 2476 93.6 
Wait for phone 1304 49.3 
Wait for electricity connection 964 36.4 
Wait for water connection 804 30.4 
Wait for health certification 644 24.3 
Shipment losses 2616 98.9 
Dummy for email 2646 100.0 
Dummy for internet page 2646 100.0 
Infrastructures 
Dummy for electronic invoice system 2646 100.0 
Dummy for criminal activity 2646 100.0 
Losses due to criminal activity 192 7.3 
Security expenses 2558 96.7 
Illegal payments for protection 2536 95.8 
Dummy for consulting  2646 100.0 
Dummy for payments to deal with bureaucratic issues 2446 92.4 
Manager’s time spent in bureaucratic issues 2556 96.6 
Sales declared to taxes 2240 84.7 
Labor costs declared 2340 88.4 
Number of inspections 2494 94.3 
Dummy for payments to obtain a contract with the government 2646 100.0 
Conflicts with clients 1684 63.6 
Average duration of conflicts 430 16.3 
Absenteeism 2530 95.6 
Wait for a construction related permit 772 29.2 
Wait for a main operating license 858 32.4 
Dummy for new land or building 2646 100.0 
Delay to obtain a land or a building 1920 72.6 
Transaction fees to obtain a land or a building 1528 57.7 
Payment to government or private parties to obtain a land or a building 1084 41.0 
Dummy for contract enforcement 1270 48.0 
Dummy for alternative resolution of conflicts 1070 40.4 
Dummy for lawsuit 2646 100.0 




Sales never repaid 2062 77.9 
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Table B.3 (II): Total number of observations and response rate of IC and C variables in the original 
sample 
Blocks of ICAs  Name of the variable #Observations Response rate 
Dummy for credit line 2646 100.00 
Dummy for loan 2646 100.00 
Dummy for loan outstanding 2646 100.00 
Dummy for loan bank 2646 100.00 
Dummy for loan leasing 2646 100.00 
Dummy for loan public 2646 100.00 
Dummy for loan informal 2646 100.00 
Dummy for loan DOT 2646 100.00 
Dummy for loan Turkish Lira 2646 100.00 
Dummy for loan foreign currency 2646 100.00 
Dummy for loan with collateral 2646 100.00 
Dummy for loan long term 2646 100.00 




Dummy for external auditory 2646 100.00 
Dummy for quality certification 2646 100.00 
Dummy for new product 2646 100.00 
Dummy for product upgraded 2646 100.00 
Dummy for new technology purchased 2646 100.00 
Dummy for licensed technology 2646 100.00 
Dummy for education of the manager 2584 97.66 
Conflicts with employees 2610 98.64 
Duration of conflicts with employees 1070 40.44 
Staff-skilled workers 2622 99.09 
Staff-unskilled workers 2622 99.09 
Staff-professional workers 2622 99.09 
Staff-part time workers 2606 98.49 
Staff-female workers 2606 98.49 
Staff-temporal workers 2636 99.62 
Dummy for internal training 2646 100.00 
Dummy for external training 2646 100.00 
Training skilled workers  1316 49.74 
Training unskilled workers  1320 49.89 
Weeks of training of skilled workers 1234 46.64 
Weeks of training of unskilled workers 1282 48.45 
Staff-university  2550 96.37 











Table B.3 (III): Total number of observations and response rate of IC and C variables in the original 
sample 
Blocks of ICAs  Name of the variable #Observations Response rate 
Dummy for incorporated company 2646 100.00 
Dummy for public 2646 100.00 
Dummy for foreign direct investment 2646 100.00 
Age of the firm 2646 100.00 
Number of competitors 1522 57.52 
Dummy for exporter 2646 100.00 
Dummy for importer 2646 100.00 
Percentage of capacity utilization 2596 98.11 
Dummy for holding company 2646 100.00 
Market share 1984 74.98 
Competitive pressure 2646 100.00 
Percentage of workforce unionized 2558 96.67 
Strikes 2546 96.22 
Dummy for rent land 2646 100.00 
Dummy for rent buildings 2646 100.00 
Dummy for ownership 2646 100.00 
Dummy for industrial zone 2646 100.00 
Dummy for foreign competition 2646 100.00 
Other Control 
Variables 






























Table B.4 (I):  List of Significant IC and C Variables, their Measurement Units, Equations in 
which they are Significant and Form (Industry-Region Averages or not) in which Each 
Variable Enters the Equations. 




Days to clear customs for exports Logs W Yes 
Days to clear customs for imports Logs P, Exp and 
FDI 
Yes 
Average duration of power outages Logs P Yes 
Number of power outages Logs Exp Yes 
No Logs W Yes 
Wait for phone Days P  Yes 
Shipment losses Fraction W Yes 
Dummy for e-mail 0 or 1 P, L and Exp No 
Infrastructures 
Dummy for internet page 0 or 1 W Yes 
Losses due to criminal activity Logs P Yes 
Security expenses Logs W and Exp Yes 
Illegal payments for protection Logs P  Yes 
Manager’s time spent in bur. Issues Percentage P, L and W Yes 
Sales declared to taxes Percentage P, L and Exp Yes 
Labor cost declared Percentage L and W  Yes 
Number of inspections Logs P and Exp No 
Dummy for payments to obtain a contract with the 
gov. 
0 or 1 L and FDI Yes but only in foreign 
direct investment eq. 
Absenteeism Logs P  Yes 
Dummy for Lawsuit 0 or 1 P No 




Dummy for informal competition 0 or 1   No 
Dummy for credit line 0 or 1 L No 
Dummy for loan 0 or 1 Exp  No 
Dummy for loan outstanding 0 or 1 L and IZ No 
Dummy for loan bank 0 or 1 L No 
Dummy for Loan informal 0 or 1 W and IZ No 
Dummy for loan Turkish Lira 0 or 1 W and L No 
Dummy for loan collateral 0 or 1 L No 
Dummy for loan long term 0 or 1 W No 
Dummy for rent land 0 or 1 L No 




Dummy for external auditory 0 or 1 P, L and Exp Yes but only in productivity 
eq. 













Table B.4 (II):  List of Significant IC and C Variables, their Measurement Units, Equations in 
which they are Significant and Form (Industry-Region Averages or not) in which Each 
Variable Enters the Equations. 




Dummy for quality certification 0 or 1 L and Exp No 
Dummy for new product 0 or 1 FDI Yes 
Dummy for new technology purchased 0 or 1 P and L Yes but only in 
productivity eq. 
Dummy for licensed technology 0 or 1 FDI  No 
Education of the manager 0 or 1 L, Exp and 
FDI 
Yes but only in foreign 
direct investment eq. 
Staff-skilled workers Percentage Exp No 
Staff-unskilled workers Percentage P No 
Staff-professional workers Percentage W No 
Pstaff=part time workers Percentage P  No 
Staff-female workers Percentage W No 
Staff-temporal workers Percentage W No 
Dummy for internal training 0 or 1 L and FDI Yes but only in foreign 
direct investment eq. 
Dummy for external training 0 or 1 L No 
Training unskilled workers Percentage W Yes 
Weeks of training of skilled workers Logs P Yes 
Weeks of training of unskilled workers Logs Exp No 
Quality, 
Innovation and 
labor Skills  
University staff Percentage P, L and FDI No 
Dummy for incorporated company 0 or 1 W, L, Exp 
and FDI 
No 
Dummy for public 0 or 1 L No 
Age of the firm Logs P No 
Number of competitors Logs W and Exp Yes 
Dummy for exporter 0 or 1 L and FDI No 
Percentage of capacity utilization Percentage Exp No 
percentage of workforce unionized Percentage W and Exp Yes 
Dummy for ownership 0 or 1 P and L No 
Dummy for industrial zone 0 or 1 W  No 
dummy for small firms 0 or 1 P No 
Dummy for medium firms 0 or 1 P and W No 
Other Control 
Variables 
Dummy for young firms 0 or 1 L and W  No 
















Table B.5: Correlation matrix among productivity measures  
  
Two steps Single step Restricted Single step Unrestricted 
  
Solow’s Residual Cobb Douglas Translog Cobb Douglas Translog 
  
Restr. Unrestr. OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE OLS RE 
Restricted Solow's 
residual 1          
Unrestricted Solow's 
residual 0.993 1         
Cobb Douglas OLS 0.926 0.918 1        
Cobb Douglas RE 0.923 0.915 0.999 1       
Translog OLS 0.915 0.908 0.993 0.993 1      
Translog RE 0.911 0.905 0.993 0.994 0.999 1     
Cobb Douglas OLS 0.596 0.611 0.637 0.638 0.639 0.638 1    
Cobb Douglas RE 0.591 0.609 0.633 0.634 0.635 0.635 0.99 1   
Translog OLS 0.046 0.007 0.052 0.049 0.044 0.043 -0.07 -0.089 1  
Translog RE -0.001 -0.043 -0.008 -0.011 -0.017 -0.017 -0.127 -0.127 0.968 1 
Notes: 
a)  Solow residuals in logs are obtained as sales (in logarithms or logs) minus a weighted sum of labor, materials, capital 
(all in logs) where the weights are given by the share in total costs of each of the inputs.  
(1)    Restricted case: the cost shares are calculated as the averages of the plant-level cost shares across the entire 
sample.  
(2)    Unrestricted by Industry case: the cost shares are calculated as the averages across plant-level cost shares for each 
of the eight industries. 
(3)    Outlier plants were defined as those which had ratios of materials to sales larger than one or had ratios of labor 
costs to sales larger than one. 
b)  Estimated Productivities in logs are obtained from Cobb-Douglas and Translog production functions of sales with 
inputs labor, materials, and capital estimated by OLS and by random effects under two different environments: 
(1)    Restricted: a single set of production function coefficients is obtained using data on plants, for all industries 
(excluding outliers). 
(2)    Unrestricted by Industry: a set of production function coefficients is obtained for each one of eight industries using 















Table C.1a: ICA elasticities and semi-elasticities with respect to productivity, restricted 
estimation. 
  Two steps 
estimation 
Single step estimation 
  Solow residual Cobb-Douglas Translog 
Blocks of ICA 







Days to clear customs to imports (a) -0.171*** -0.171** -0.199*** -0.198*** -0.198*** -0.202*** 
Average duration of power outages (a) -0.332*** -0.332*** -0.323*** -0.318*** -0.286*** -0.293*** 
Delay to obtain a phone connection (a) -0.005** -0.005** -0.005*** -0.005** -0.004** -0.004* 
Infrastructures 
Dummy for e-mail 0.074 0.074 0.160*** 0.166** 0.129** 0.134** 
Losses due to criminal activity (a) -0.097*** -0.097*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.082*** -0.080*** 
Manager's time spent in bur. issues (a) -0.021*** -0.021** -0.016** -0.016* -0.016** -0.016* 
Illegal payments for protection -0.254*** -0.254** -0.205** -0.216** -0.229*** -0.238** 
Sales declared to taxes (a) 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009** 
Number of inspections -0.032 -0.032 -0.027 -0.026 -0.028 -0.026 
Absenteeism (a) -0.271** -0.271* -0.297** -0.297** -0.303** -0.292** 








Dummy for external auditory (a) 0.769* 0.769** 1.008*** 0.992*** 0.800** 0.842** 
Dummy for new technology purchased 
(a) 0.187 0.187 0.256 0.26 0.295 0.318 
Staff-unskilled workers -0.182** -0.182** -0.087 -0.079 -0.086 -0.081 





Weeks of training of skilled workers (a) 0.041*** 0.041** 0.014 0.015 0.017 0.016 
Ageof the firm -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
Dummy for ownership 0.344** 0.344 0.447*** 0.445* 0.453*** 0.472** 
Dummy for small firms -0.243*** -0.243*** -0.769*** -0.817*** -0.875*** -0.933*** 
Other control 
variables 
Dummy for médium -0.289*** -0.289*** -0.435*** -0.467*** -0.546*** -0.585*** 
Observations 1516 1516 1516 1516 1516 1516 
  R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.78 
Notes. 
Significance is given by robust standard errors.*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Similar results by robust cluster errors. The more relevant changes are in Dummy for external audit and Weeks of training 
of skilled workers, both variables are significant at 15% in this case. 
Each regression includes a set of industry dummies, year dummies and a constant term. 














Table C.1b: ICA elasticities and semi-elasticities with respect to productivity, unrestricted 
estimation. 
  Two steps 
estimation 
Single step estimation 
  Solow residual Cobb-Douglas Translog 
Blocks of ICA 







Days to clear customs to imports (a) -0.152** -0.152** -0.151** -0.154** -0.141** -0.136* 
Average duration of power outages (a) -0.293*** -0.293*** -0.268*** -0.255*** -0.170* -0.159* 
Delay to obtain a phone connection (a) -0.005** -0.005** -0.004** -0.005** -0.004** -0.004* 
Infrastructures 
Dummy for e-mail 0.061 0.061 0.144** 0.151** 0.130** 0.141** 
Losses due to criminal activity (a) -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.076*** -0.074*** -0.069*** -0.068*** 
Manager's time spent in bur. issues (a) -0.020*** -0.020** -0.021*** -0.020** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
lllegal payments for protection -0.267*** -0.267** -0.166* -0.165 -0.195** -0.208** 
Sales declared to taxes (a) 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.006* 0.006* 
Number of inspections -0.036* -0.036 -0.036* -0.036 -0.022 -0.024 
Absenteeism (a) -0.260** -0.260* -0.241** -0.254* -0.271** -0.293** 




Dummy for informal competition -0.098** -0.098** -0.110*** -0.113** -0.109*** -0.116*** 
Finance and 
corporate 
governance Dummy for external auditory (a) 0.717* 0.717** 0.695* 0.669** 0.514 0.557* 
Dummy for new technology purchased (a) 0.241 0.241 0.212 0.203 0.526** 0.514** 
Staff-unskilled workers -0.167** -0.167** -0.086 -0.087 -0.044 -0.038 





Weeks of training of skilled workers (a) 0.043*** 0.043** 0.019 0.017 0.006 0.003 
Ageof the firm -0.0001*** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
Dummy for ownership 0.350** 0.350** 0.350** 0.350** 0.350** 0.350** 
Dummy for small firms -0.226*** -0.226*** -0.622*** -0.660*** -0.442*** -0.477*** 
Other control 
variables 
Dummy for médium -0.294*** -0.294*** -0.376*** -0.397*** -0.148 -0.182* 
Observations 1516 1516 1516 1516 1516 1516 
  R-squared 0.204 0.204 0.803 0.803 0.845 0.845 
Notes. 
Significance is given by robust standard errors.*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Similar results by robust cluster errors. The more relevant changes are in Dummy for external audit and Weeks of training 
of skilled workers, both variables are significant at 15% in this case. 
Each regression includes a set of industry dummies, year dummies and a constant term. 












Table D.1: Two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation of employment equation 
  Restricted Solow residual1 Unrestricted Solow 
residual1 
Blocks of ICA 
vars. 





-0.072** -3.59 -0.074** -3.66 
Real wages 
-0.101*** -21.98 -0.101*** -21.97 
Infrastructures 
Dummy for e-mail 0.267*** 5.49 0.267*** 5.48 
Manager’s time spent in bureaucratic issues (a) 0.018*** 4.15 0.018*** 4.17 
Dummy for informal competition -0.077* -0.96 -0.077* -0.97 
Sales declared to taxes (a) -0.015*** -19.89 -0.015*** -19.91 
Labor costs declared (a) 0.019*** 34.19 0.019*** 34.19 
Dummy for payments to obtain a contract with the 




Transaction fees to obtain a land or a building (a) -0.075** -15.91 -0.074** -15.77 
Dummy for credit line 0.214*** 2.77 0.215*** 2.78 
Dummy for loan bank 0.156** 8.55 0.157** 8.49 
Dummy for Loan outstanding 0.333*** 1.68 0.331*** 1.69 
Dummy for loan Turkish Lira -0.278*** -2.16 -0.277*** -2.14 
Dummy for loan with collateral -0.269*** -2.08 -0.268*** -2.08 




Dummy for external auditory 0.239*** 2.5 0.239*** 2.51 
Qdummy for quality certification 0.448*** 4.61 0.447*** 4.61 
Dummy for new technology purchased 0.226*** 2.59 0.226*** 2.59 
Education of the manager 0.451*** 7.89 0.451*** 7.89 
Dummy for internal training 0.200*** 2.65 0.199*** 2.64 




University staff -0.013*** -3.63 -0.013*** -3.63 
Dummy for incorporated company 0.253** 0.26 0.253** 0.26 
Dummy for public 0.722*** 0.2 0.723*** 0.2 
Dummy for exporter 0.353*** 4.25 0.353*** 4.25 
Dummy for ownership 0.755*** 0.26 0.755*** 0.26 
Other control 
variables 
Dummy for young firms -0.311*** -1.07 -0.311*** -1.07 
Partial R-squared F test (p-value)5 0 0 Instruments 
evaluation 




  Observations 1638   1638   
NOTES: 
Significance is given by robust standard errors.*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Similar results by robust cluster errors.  
Each regression includes a set of industry dummies, year dummies and a constant term. 
(a) Variables instrumented with the industry-region-size average. 
1
 Productivity is endogenous and the list of variables used as excluded instruments is: Days to clear customs to imports (i-
r av.), Losses due to criminal activity (i-r av.), Wait for a phone connection (i-r av.), Illegal payments for protection (i-r av.), 
Number of power outages (i-r av.), Absenteeism (i-r av.) and Weeks training for skilled workers (i-r av.) 
2
 Results from equation (5.1b). 
5
 The Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, 




Table D.2: Two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation of real wages equation 
  Restricted Solow residual1 Unrestricted Solow 
residual1 
Blocks of ICA 
vars. 




Productivity 0.470*** 10.81 0.465*** 10.57 
Days to clear customs for exports (a) -0.180** -2.64 -0.196** -2.89 
Average duration of water outages (a) -0.691** -0.97 -0.637** -0.9 
Shipment losses (a) -0.136*** -3.24 -0.133*** -3.17 
Infrastructures 
Dummy for internet page (a) 0.731** 5.88 0.572* 4.59 
Security expenses (a) 0.114*** 11.54 0.133*** 13.49 
Manager’s time spent in bur. Issues (a) 0.089*** 9.45 0.087*** 9.19 




Absenteeism (a) -0.361*** -1.34 -0.381*** -1.42 
Dummy for loan informal 0.578* 0.03 0.848** 0.05 
Dummy for loan Turkish Lira 0.123** 0.44 0.123** 0.44 




Dummy for rent buildings (a) -0.248** -5 -0.218** -4.4 
Staff-professional workers 0.548*** 1.01 0.529*** 0.98 
Staff-part time workers -0.693*** -0.77 -0.810*** -0.81 




Training unskilled workers (a) 0.007** 3.79 0.008*** 4.43 
Dummy for incorporated Company -0.394** -0.18 -0.424** -0.2 
Competitors (a) -0.369*** -9.43 -0.372*** -9.52 
Trade union (a) 0.024*** 1.52 0.025*** 1.6 
Dummy for industrial zone -0.172*** -1.26 -0.175*** -1.29 
Dummy for medium firms 0.160*** 0.71 0.159*** 0.7 
Other control 
variables 
Dummy for young firms 0.194*** 0.31 0.217*** 0.34 
F-test (p-values) 0 0 Instruments 
evaluation 




  Observations 1614   1614   
NOTES: 
Significance is given by robust standard errors.*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Similar results by robust cluster errors. The more relevant changes are in Labor cost declared and Weeks of training of 
unskilled workers, both variables are significant at 20% in this case. 
Each regression includes a set of industry dummies, year dummies and a constant term. 
(a) Variables instrumented with the industry-region-size average. 
1
 Productivity is endogenous and the list of variables used as excluded instruments is: Losses due to criminal activity (i-r 
av.), Wait for a phone connection (i-r av.), Illegal payments for protection (i-r av.), Number of power outages, Dummy for 
informal competition, Dummy for lawsuit, Weeks training for skilled workers (i-r av.)  
2
 Results from equation (5.2b). 
5
 The Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, 






Table D.3: Two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation of probability of exporting equation 
  Restricted Solow residual1 Unrestricted Solow 
residual1 
Blocks of ICA 
vars. 




Productivity 0.178** 74.01 0.180** 73.87 
Days to clear customs for imports (a) -0.075* -26.98 -0.077* -27.8 
Number of power outages (a) -0.123*** -57.25 -0.122*** -56.5 
Infrastructures 
Dummy for e-mail 0.136*** 23.16 0.138*** 23.54 
Sales declared to taxes (a) -0.003* -32.14 -0.003* -32.24 
Security expenses (a) 0.084*** 153.44 0.084*** 153.09 




Dummy for informal competition -0.05 -4.71 -0.046* -4.76 
Dummy for loan 0.046* 5.37 0.047** 5.49 Finance and 
corporate 
governance Dummy for external auditory 0.073*** 6.34 0.073*** 6.37 
Dummy for quality certification 0.064** 5.43 0.064** 5.47 
Education of the manager 0.128*** 18.61 0.129*** 18.69 




Weeks of training of unskilled workers (a) 0.015** 6.85 0.015** 6.92 
Dummy for incorporated Company 0.178*** 1.5 0.178*** 1.5 
Number of competitors (a) -0.141*** -65.19 -0.142*** -65.75 
Percentage of capacity utilization 0.003*** 37.77 0.003*** 38.34 
Other control 
variables 
Percentage of unionized workers (a) -0.014*** -16.43 -0.014*** -16.36 
F-test (p-values) 0 0 Instruments 
evaluation 




  Observations 1528   1528   
NOTES: 
Significance is given by robust standard errors.*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Similar results by robust cluster errors. The more relevant change is in Dummy for informal competition; the variable is 
significant at 12% in this case. 
Each regression includes a set of industry dummies, year dummies and a constant term. 
(a) Variables instrumented with the industry-region-size average. 
1
 Productivity is endogenous and the list of variables used as excluded instruments is: Losses due to criminal activity (i-r 
av.), Manager’s time spent in bureaucratic issues (i-r av.), Illegal payments for protection, (i-r av.) Dummy for external 
auditory (i-r av.), Dummy for new technology (i-r av.,) Absenteeism (i-r av.) and Weeks training for skilled workers (i-r av.).   
2
 Results from equation (5.3b). 
5
 The Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, 












Table D.4: Two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation of probability of receiving FDI 
  Restricted Solow residual1 Unrestricted Solow residual1 
Blocks of ICA 
vars. 




Productivity 0.037** 284.32 0.038** 294.13 




Dummy for payments to obtain a contract 
with the government (a) -0.166** -155.35 -0.168** -156.81 
Dummy for new product (a) 0.143* 202.62 0.139* 197.43 
Dummy for licensed technology 0.028* 16.4 0.028* 16.31 
Education of the manager (a) 0.105*** 281.28 0.105*** 281.22 




University staff 0.001** 48.58 0.001** 48.86 
Dummy for incorporated Company 0.065* 10.16 0.065* 10.19 Other control 
variables 
Dummy for exporter 0.019** 35 0.019** 35.43 
F-test (p-values) 0 0 Instruments 
evaluation 




  Observations 1644   1644   
NOTES: 
Significance is given by robust standard errors.*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Similar results by robust cluster errors. The more relevant change is in Dummy for incorporate company; the variable is 
significant at 15% in this case. 
Each regression includes a set of industry dummies and a constant term. 
(a) Variables instrumented with the industry-region-size average. 
1
 Productivity is endogenous and the list of variables used as excluded instruments is: Losses due to criminal activity (i-r 
av.), Manager’s time spent in bureaucratic issues (i-r av.), Sales declared to taxes (i-r av.), Wait for a phone connection (i-
r av.), Illegal payments for protection (i-r av.), Dummy for external auditory (i-r av.), Number of power outages (i-r av.), 
Dummy for new technology (i-r av.), Absenteeism (i-r av.), Dummy for informal competition, Dummy for e-mail, Weeks 
training for skilled workers (i-r av.) , Dummy for small firms and Dummy for medium firms.   
2
 Results from equation (5.4b).  
5
 The Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, 


















































Source: Authors’ calculations with World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessment data.   
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Productivity - + + +
Em ploym ent














Source: Authors’ calculations with World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessment data.   
 




Days to clear customs for exports -
Days to clear customs for imports - - -
Average duration of power outages -
Power outages -




Dummy for e-mail + + +
Dummy for internet page +
Delay to obtain a phone connection -
Losses due to criminal activity -
Security expenses +
dummy for illegal payments for 
protection -
Manager’s time spent in bur. Issues - + +
Sales declared to taxes + - - -
Labor cost declared +
Number of inspections - +
Payments to obtain a contract with the 
government - -
Absenteeism - -
Dummy for lawsuit -
Transaction fees to obtain a land or a 
building -
Sales never repaid
Dummy for informal competition - - -
Dummy for credit line +
Dummy for loan +
Dummy for loan outstanding of credit 
institutions +
Dummy for loan from bank +
Dummy for loan from leasing
Dummy for loan from informal sources +
Dummy for loan in Turkish Lira - +
Dummy for loan with collateral -
Dummy for long term loan +
Dummy for external auditory + + +
Dummy for firm that rents land - +
Dummy for firm that rents buildings -
Dependent Variable


























Source: Authors’ calculations with World Bank’s Investment Climate Assessment data.   
 




Dummy for quality certification + +
Dummy for new product +
Dummy for new technology purchased + +
Dummy for foreign licensed technology +
Education of the manager + + +
Perc. of skilled workers in staff +
Perc. of unskilled workers in staff -
Perc. of professional workers in staff +
Perc. of part-time workers in staff - -
Perc. of female workers in staff -
Perc. of temporal workers in staff
Dummy for internal training + +
Dummy for external training +
Dummy for training to unskilled workers +
Weeks of training of skilled workers +
Weeks of training of unskilled workers +
Percentage of university workers in 
staff - +
Dummy for incorporated company + - + +
Dummy for public firm +
Age of the firm -
Number of competitors - -
Percentage of capacity utilization +
Percentage of unionized workers -
Dummy for recently privatized firm + +
Dummy for firm located in an industrial 
zone -
Dummy for small size firm -
Dummy for medium size firm - +
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Figure 1 












Productivity Employment Real Wages Exports FDI
Productivity Real Wages
Infrastructures Red Tape, Corruption and Crime
Finance and Corporate Governance Quality, Innovation and Labor Skills
Other Control Variables
 
  Productivity Employment  Real Wages Exports FDI 
Productivity - 2.17 14.29 13.38 17.83 
Real Wages - 13.30 - - - 
Infrastructures 15.42 3.32 16.82 19.41 17.00 
Red Tape, Corruption and Crime 64.96 45.90 37.45 36.16 9.74 
Finance and Corporate Gov. 9.81 17.50 7.32 2.12 - 
Quality, Innovation and labor skills 9.58 14.79 7.74 7.08 52.59 
Other Control Variables 0.23 3.01 16.37 21.85 2.83 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
NOTE: 
Each decomposition represents, the contributions of IC blocks of variables, relative to the total IC effects on each 






































T.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 T.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 T.3 3.1 T.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 T.5 5.1 5.2
T.1 Total infrastructures
1.1 Days to clear cusoms to import
1.2 Avg. duration of power outages
1.3 Wait for phone
1.4 Dummy for e-mail
T.2 Total red tape corruption and 
crime
2.1 Losses due to criminal activity
2.2 Manager's time spent in bur. issues
2.3 Dummy for illegal payments for protection
T.4 Total quality, innovation and labor 
skills4.1 New technology purchased
4.2 Staff-unskilled workers
4.3 Staff-part-time workers
4.4 Weeks of training of skilled workers
T.5 Total other control variables
5.1 Age of the firm
5.2 Dummy for ownership
%
2.4 Sales declared to taxes
2.5 Number of inspections
2.6 Absenteeism
2.7 Dummy for Lawsuit
2.8 Dummy for informal competition
T.3 Total finance and corporate 
governance
3.1 Dummy for external auditory
Infrastructures Red tape, corruption and crime Fin. &
corp.gov









































T.1 T.2 T.3 3.1 T.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 T.5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 T.6 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 T.7 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4
T.1 Log of Productivity
T.2 Log of Real wage
T.3 Total infrastructures
3.1 Dummy for e-mail
T.4 Total red tape, corruption and 
crime
4.1 Manager's time spent in bur. issues
4.2 Dummy for informal competition 
4.3 Sales declared to taxes
4.4 Labor costs declared
4.5 Payments to obtain a contract with the gov.
4.6 Transaction fees to obtain a land or building
6.2 Dummy for new technology
6.3 Education of the manager
6.4 Dummy for internal training
6.5 Dummy for external training
6.6 University staff
T.7 Total other control variables
7.1 Dummy for incorprated copany
7.2 Dummy for public
7.3 Dummy for exporter
7.5 Dummy for ownership
%
T.5 Total finance and corporate 
governance
5.1 Dummy for credit line
5.2 Dummy for loan outstanding
5.3 Dummy for loan bank
5.4 Dummy for loan Turkish Lira
5.5 Dummy for loan collateral
5.6 Dummy for rent land 
5.7 Dummy for external auditory
T.6 Total Quality, innovation and labor 
skills
6.1 Dummy for quality certification
Infrast. Red tape, corruption and 
crime
Finance and corporate 
governance








































T.1 T.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 T.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 T.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 T.5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 T.6 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4
T.1 Log of Productivity.
T.2 Total infrastructures
2.1 Days to clear customs to exports.
2.2 Average duration of water outages.
2.3 Shipment losses.
2.4 Dummy for internet page.
T.3 Total red tape corruption and 
crime
3.1 Security expenses




5.4 Training unskilled workers.
T.6 Total other control variables
6.1 Dummy for incorporated company
6.2 Number of competitors
6.3 Percentage of workforce unionized
6.4 Dummy for industrial zone.
%
3.3 Labor cost declared.
3.4 Absenteeism.
T.4 Total finance and corporate 
governance
4.1 Dummy for loan informal.
4.2 Dummy for loan Turkish lira.
4.3 Dummy for loan long term
4.4 Dummy for rent buildings
T.5 Total uality, innovation and  labor 
skills
Infrastructures Red tape, corruption and 
crime
Finance and corporate 
governance





























T.1 T.2 2.1 2.2 2.3 T.3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 T.4 4.1 4.2 T.5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 T.6 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4
T.1 Log of Productivity.
T.2 Total infrastructures
2.1 Days to clear customs to imports.
2.2 Number of power outages.
2.3 Dummy for e-mail.
T.3 Total red tape corruption and 
crime
3.1 Sales declared to taxes.
3.2 Security expenses.
3.3 Number of inspections.
5.2 Education of the manager.
5.3 Staff-skilled workers.
5.4 Weeks of training of unskilled workers.
T.7 Total other control variables
6.1 Dummy for incorporated Company.
6.2 Number of competitors.
6.3 Percentage of capacity utilization.
6.4 Percentage of workforce unionized.
%
3.4 Dummy for informal competition
T.4 Total finance and corporate 
governance
4.1 Dummy for loan
4.2 Dummy for external auditory.
T.5 Total quality, innovation and labor 
skills
5.1 Quality certification.





























T.1 T.2 2.1 T.3 3.1 T.4 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 T.5 5.1 5.2
T.1 Log of Productivity.
T.2 Total infrastructures
2.1 Days to clear customs to imports.
4.3 Education of the manager.
4.4 Dummy for internal training.
4.5 University staff.
T.5 Total other control variables
5.1 Dummy for incorporated company.
52 Dummy for exporter.
%
T.3 Total red tape corruption and crime
3.1 Dummy for payms. to obtain a contract with 
the government
T.4 Total quality, innovation and labor 
skills
4.1 Dummy for new product.
4.2 Dummy for licensed technology.
Infrastructures Red tape, corr. 
and crime








































Small firms Medium firms Large firms
%
Infrastuctures Red tape, corruption 
and crime
Finance and corporate 
governance
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Figure 3.4  















































Small firms Medium firms Large firms
%


























































Small firms Medium firms Large firms
%















Firm’s perceptions; percentage of firms that considers each one of the following 












1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 4.1 4.2 5 6




* The last two columns represent the relative contribution of each IC group to the total. In the last column 
we compensate the different number of questions in each IC group by computing the contribution to the 





















1.2 Electricity  
1.3 Transportation 
1.4 Customs and trade regulations 
 
2 Red tape, corruption and crime. 
2.1 Business Licensing and Operating 
Permits 
2.2 Tax Rates 
2.3 Tax Administration 
 
2.4 Corruption 
2.5 Crime, theft and disorder 
2.6 Anti-competitive or Informal 
Practices 
2.7 Legal system/ Conflict Resolution  
 
3. Finance. 
3.1 Access to Land 
3.2 Access to Finance 
3.3 Cost of Finance 
3.4 Macroeconomic uncertainty 
4. Labor skills. 
4.1 Labor Regulations 
4.2 Skills and Education of Available 
Workforce 
 
5. Total relative weights. 
6. Average group relative weights. 
* (Totals are computed as the relative weigh 
of each group of perceptions over the sum 
of all perceptions' weights)  
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Figure 5: Comparison of Turkey’s performance with 4 selected economies according 
to World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2007 
 
Ranking out of 178 economies, in parentheses is the ranking within the sample of five economies included 
in the figure. Highlighted in red are the factors for which Turkey is below the middle of the ranking, says 
89 out of 178. Source: Doing Business Report 2007, World Bank, Washington D.C. 
 


























Chile 28 (1) 33 (1) 59 (2) 67 (1) 32 (2) 45 (1) 32 (1) 34 (1) 35 (1) 63 (1) 98 (2)
Mexico 41 (2) 62 (3) 20 (1) 134 (4) 79 (3) 45 (1) 32 (1) 140 (4) 69 (2) 79 (2) 23 (1)
Turkey 65 (3) 40 (2) 126 (4) 138 (5) 30 (1) 62 (3) 62 (5) 85 (2) 73 (4) 36 (4) 114 (3)
Brazil 113 (4) 120 (5) 95 (3) 116 (3) 109 (5) 80 (5) 62 (5) 139 (3) 70 (3) 112 (3) 136 (5)
India 132 (5) 93 (4) 133 (5) 83 (2) 108 (4) 62 (4) 32 (3) 158 (5) 142 (5) 177 (5) 135 (4)
